The F-35 ‘Kill Switch’: Separating Myth from Reality

With heightened tensions between Europe and the US over NATO and Ukraine, the parable of an F-35 “kill change”, which might supposedly enable the Pentagon to disable foreign-operated F-35s, is fueling hypothesis and debate.

Within the shadow of escalating tensions between Europe and the US over NATO commitments and the battle in Ukraine, a persistent delusion concerning the F-35 Lightning II has exploded on-line: the notion that the Pentagon has embedded a “kill change” within the fifth-generation fighter jet, permitting it to remotely disable or impair the plane operated by overseas allies.

With over 1,100 F-35s in service throughout 16 armed forces worldwide, this rumor has gained fast traction on-line, stoking fears amongst  nations like Germany and Canada about their navy sovereignty—and U.S. management in a time of great geopolitical uncertainty.

The “kill change” narrative posits that the U.S. can deactivate or restrict the fight features of F-35s offered to allied nations, successfully holding a veto over their navy operations. This concern has echoed in X discussions, with customers claiming, “Europeans at the moment are fearful if there’s a kill change in all of the American weapons offered to Europe! (Reply: Sure ).”

Some on-line voices declare the jet’s eight million traces of code cover a backdoor for distant deactivation, and lots of others urge Canada to cancel its $14.5 billion F-35 order, citing fears of U.S. means to “brick” the jets.

The parable’s resurgence comes as mistrust towards the brand new Washington administration grows, with some European lawmakers and on-line commentators speculating wildly about U.S. intentions amid Trump’s current freezes on navy assist to Ukraine and intelligence-sharing pauses.

Net studies, together with statements from Belgian and Swiss officers, deny the existence of a bodily kill change. Nonetheless, the truth that the F-35 is a software-defined weapon system (roughly manufactured from +8 million traces of code) of extremely networked nature, reliant on methods just like the Autonomic Logistics Info System (ALIS), its successor Operational Knowledge Built-in Community (ODIN), and software program updates, has raised authentic questions on U.S. affect over allied operations.

However is that this the actual drawback?

U.S. Management Over F-35 Operations: Past the Delusion

Current revelations about U.S. coverage restrictions on F-35 operations add a brand new layer to the talk. In line with the 350th Spectrum Warfare Group’s F-35 Program Support Cell, worldwide F-35 operators “are usually not allowed to conduct unbiased take a look at operations outdoors of the Continental United States (CONUS) primarily based on U.S. coverage. United States Authorities (USG) safety guidelines and Nationwide Protection Coverage (NDP) require that U.S. residents carry out particular features with a view to defend essential U.S. expertise.”

This coverage, detailed on the U.S. Air Drive web site, underscores the U.S.’s tight grip on the F-35’s superior methods, limiting overseas operators’ means to check or modify the plane independently. For NATO allies like Italy, Germany, and the UK, this restriction heightens issues about operational sovereignty, particularly as they depend on the F-35 for essential missions, together with nuclear deterrence.

By the best way, as of now, Israel is the one nation permitted to function a completely unbiased system for its F-35I Adir.

Whereas this coverage doesn’t represent a “kill change,” it amplifies fears of U.S. management, notably as European nations query their dependence on American expertise amid strained transatlantic relations. Wolfgang Ischinger, former head of the Munich Safety Convention, informed Bild that if the U.S. had been to limit German F-35s because it has with Ukraine’s F-16s, “then the problem of contract cancellation could also be thought-about.”

ALIS and ODIN

The F-35’s logistical spine, ALIS, was designed to streamline upkeep, provide chain administration, mission planning, and debriefing for the worldwide fleet, as described by Lockheed Martin:

“ALIS integrates a broad vary of capabilities together with operations, upkeep, prognostics, provide chain, buyer help companies, coaching, and technical information… transmitting plane well being and upkeep motion info to technicians worldwide.”

Utilizing radio frequency downlinks, ALIS pre-positions elements and maintainers to reduce downtime, but it surely has struggled with information inaccuracies and inefficiencies, incomes it a fame as one of many F-35’s most troubled methods.

To deal with these points, the U.S. Division of Protection is transitioning to ODIN, a cloud-native system geared toward enhancing sustainment and readiness. In line with the F-35 Joint Program Workplace, ODIN will “lower F-35 administrator and maintainer workload, improve mission functionality charges for all F-35 variants, and permit software program engineers to quickly develop and deploy updates in response to rising warfighter necessities.”

ODIN guarantees extra environment friendly communication, edge processing, and fewer centralization to deal with export clients’ issues about sharing delicate information with the U.S. producer.

Critically, neither ALIS nor ODIN interface with the F-35’s operational controls. Because the Authorities Accountability Workplace (GAO) has famous, their shortcomings relate to upkeep and information administration, not the flexibility to command or deactivate the plane in flight.

Due to this fact, even when the U.S. had been to chop entry to those methods or withhold spare elements, the F-35 would stay flyable, although upkeep would develop into way more advanced.

A deeper vulnerability: Software program Upgrades and the MDF

Past logistics, the F-35’s reliance on U.S.-provided software program updates makes the weapon system actually susceptible.

Software program upgrades, managed by the U.S., guarantee optimum efficiency and safety, however withholding them would depart the plane operational, albeit with outdated capabilities.

Consider the F-35 like a contemporary smartphone: a cutting-edge machine that depends on fixed software program updates to remain on the forefront of expertise. To unlock new capabilities, run the newest functions, and leverage progressive options, it have to be repeatedly upgraded.

For those who cease updating your smartphone, it doesn’t abruptly cease working as you may nonetheless make calls and ship messages. However over time, it turns into outdated, unable to help new apps, safety patches, or superior functionalities. Finally, it reaches a degree the place it could actually solely carry out probably the most primary duties, making it irrelevant.

To a sure extent, the F-35 operates the identical approach. It’s not simply an plane, it’s a flying networked fight system of system, depending on software-driven upgrades for mission success. With out these updates, the F-35 can nonetheless take off and fly, however its means to struggle, adapt to new threats, and penetrate superior defenses will probably be severely compromised. In fashionable warfare, the place expertise evolves at an unprecedented tempo, staying forward isn’t optionally available, it’s important.

Well-known journalist, author and, trade govt Invoice Sweetman affords a extra nuanced perspective on X, arguing that the actual subject isn’t a “kill change” however the F-35’s Mission Knowledge File (MDF). Responding to one of many X posts, Sweetman tweeted: “Most F-35 posts that begin with ‘debunk’ miss one thing necessary… It’s not only a matter of ‘updating software program.’ The Mission Knowledge File (MDF) is the digital battle guide for the F-35… It supplies recognized goal traits for the fusion engine that IDs targets with minimal emissions.”

He explains that the MDF permits essential features like plotting minimum-detectability flightpaths (the “blue line” monitor), managing communications, and internet hosting digital orders of battle—capabilities important for countering fashionable threats like Russian air defenses.

In a December 2022 article concerning the Italian Air Drive producing its first MDF file for the Italian F-35 fleet, the U.S. Air Drive defined:

“Plane depend on MDFs to supply pilots with the attention of what potential threats could also be in an space and learn how to counter them, similar to radars and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The knowledge comes from what plane sensors choose up throughout flights and is pushed by the mission information. Upon touchdown, the pilots assessment their tapes and supply suggestions on MDF efficiency to enhance future efficiency.”

Sweetman emphasizes that MDF updates are “important” and “fast and frequent” throughout battle, managed by a 90-person crew on the AustCanUK Reprogramming Laboratory (ACURL) at Eglin AFB within the U.S. With out these updates, the F-35’s fight effectiveness might be severely compromised, successfully limiting NATO allies’ operational autonomy. This dependency, he suggests, isn’t a few bodily “kill change” however about U.S. management over the jet’s software-driven capabilities, a strategic vulnerability that transcends the logistical issues of ALIS and ODIN.

Why fear concerning the F-35 when nearly every little thing in protection already will depend on the U.S.?

The F-35 “kill change” delusion underscores a deeper stress inside NATO: the steadiness between collective protection and nationwide sovereignty.

“On F-35 fears, I get it – there may be actual dependency. But when all of your concentrating on capability, BLOS comms, penetrating/orbital ISR and the munitions you assume you’d struggle with in a battle are US-provided; then dependency on the US for MDFs and ALIS/ODIN for F-35 isn’t your principal drawback,” Justin Bronk, Senior Analysis Fellow for Airpower and Army Expertise at RUSI, commented on X.

As Russia’s battle in Ukraine drags on and U.S. political reliability is questioned, European nations like Germany and Canada are reevaluating their protection methods. Germany’s use of the F-35 for nuclear deterrence with U.S.-supplied B61 Mod 12 bombs, as famous by Justin Bronk, makes it “100% depending on the U.S. regardless of the plane.”

With over 400 F-35s projected for Europe by 2030, per Lockheed Martin, the jet stays a cornerstone of NATO’s air energy—however its integration highlights a paradox: its technological edge comes at the price of strategic vulnerability. The U.S. coverage proscribing unbiased take a look at operations outdoors CONUS, mixed with reliance on U.S.-managed MDFs, ALIS, ODIN, and software program updates, amplifies fears of over-dependence.

TWZ’s Tyler Rogoway commented on X:

“[…] there is no such thing as a actual substitute for the F-35. You’d be sacrificing functionality and survivability by stepping away from it. There’s a complete ecosystem of capabilities offered past simply the F-35 plane that might should be established…So main funding could be wanted and pressure construction alterations. Unmanned capabilities and future indigenous fighter applications can remedy the potential hole probably, however this isn’t within the close to time period. Stepping away from F-35 isn’t about simply getting one other fighter.”

Whereas the present disaster will seemingly drive European protection innovation and diversification, constructing a reputable protection backup plan unbiased of U.S. help would take many years to rearrange and execute, and would require substantial funding.

We’ll see…